Will Kuaishou be "marginalized" by WeChat Video Account?

With the development of WeChat Video Account, will it achieve rapid catch-up in the short video field and pose a threat to other platforms? This article analyzes the topic of whether Kuaishou will be "marginalized" by WeChat Video Account. Let's take a look.

In 2019, there was a widely circulated rumor in the market: Tencent planned to fully acquire Kuaishou and transform it into one of its own business groups, with Kuaishou's management directly transferred to the head of the business group. Several of my friends who worked at Tencent believed this rumor, because from the situation at the time, the only way for Tencent to seize the short video wave and compete with the booming TikTok was to deepen cooperation with Kuaishou.

Since Weishi has been repeatedly proven to be a failure, and the several vertical short video apps developed by PCG have no signs of success, the only thing Tencent can count on is Kuaishou. At that time, Kuaishou was regarded as a rising and vibrant Internet star like Pinduoduo and ByteDance, which formed a sharp contrast with the old generation of Internet companies' aging management and rusty execution.

Finally, the rumored acquisition never materialized, and the specific reason is unknown. In fact, I think that this acquisition plan probably does not exist (at least it has not been seriously discussed), because the thriving Kuaishou obviously would not agree to it; and Tencent has rarely achieved external growth of its platform business through comprehensive mergers and acquisitions in history. Its mergers and acquisitions are mainly in the gaming field, and it is satisfied with strategic investment and cooperation in non-gaming fields.

In the next two or three years, Kuaishou developed well and went public. It also maintained a good relationship with Tencent. Tencent sold its shares in JD.com and Meituan, but still retained a huge stake in Kuaishou; Kuaishou video content was still forwarded unimpeded on WeChat. However, one thing completely changed the situation, that is, the rise of WeChat Video Account.

WeChat Video Account was a joke in 2020, a market disturbance factor in 2021, a product worthy of serious consideration in 2022, and the only traffic dividend in the entire short video + live broadcast track in 2023.

Among the many Internet influencers and e-commerce groups I have joined, the three most important topics this year are: first, how to deal with the increasingly severe "consumption downgrade" and sinking trend; second, how to operate private domain communities when the traffic dividend is exhausted; and third, how to maximize profits from video accounts. Specifically in the short video track, everyone will discuss Douyin and video accounts, and some people will discuss Xiaohongshu; as for Kuaishou? It is still a very important platform, that's all.

Especially after the traffic of Video Account further tilted towards e-commerce and the technical infrastructure was slightly improved (although still not as good as mature platforms), many e-commerce MCNs and KOL studios I know want to try Video Account again, many of which originally used Kuaishou as their base. A friend of mine who works in MCN told me that he thinks Video Account and Kuaishou form a "perfect replacement relationship":

First of all, Kuaishou in history has been centered on the sinking market. Today, Kuaishou is already a national-level APP with relatively complete user coverage, but user coverage in the sinking market is still its specialty and an important selling point for merchants and influencers. WeChat’s coverage capabilities in the sinking market are often overlooked by the market. In fact, among users in third-tier and lower-tier cities and counties (especially middle-aged and elderly users), WeChat plays a very important role in content consumption because vertical content APPs are not popular. WeChat is of course a national-level APP, but WeChat has deep roots and great influence in the sinking market, and the same is true for Video Account.

Secondly, Kuaishou's appeal to creators lies in its private traffic mechanism, which is generally speaking a high fan reach and fan stickiness; this is the basis for the formation of Kuaishou's major "families" and a clear difference between Kuaishou and Douyin. Because in Douyin and even all "Toutiao" apps, the algorithm recommendation mechanism determines everything, and the number of fans is just a bonus. The question is, which platform's "private traffic mechanism" can surpass WeChat, which is strongly tied to social networking? WeChat Video Account may not be able to replace Douyin, which has an algorithmic advantage, but it is enough to pose a major threat to Kuaishou, which has a similar mechanism.

Finally, due to the tit-for-tat competition between Tencent and ByteDance, Douyin videos have not yet been smoothly forwarded to WeChat; the "interconnection" at the end of 2021 actually only opened up WeChat and Taobao, and WeChat and Douyin are still in a mutually closed state. Kuaishou videos can be forwarded directly to WeChat and can also appear in the "Look" information flow, which is an important advantage. The problem is that the video account is a function of WeChat, and it has been seamlessly connected with official accounts and mini-programs. It is the "hub function" of the entire WeChat content ecosystem. The son is obviously closer than the son-in-law, and Kuaishou cannot compete with the video account in the home court of the video account.

The history of business competition has repeatedly told us that when the first and second place compete fiercely, the third place is often the one that suffers the most.

This is especially true for the Internet industry, because most Internet verticals can only accommodate two or three mainstream platforms, and the third place is inherently dangerous. Many of the ammunition thrown at each other by the first and second place in the competition will actually fall on the third place. For creators and merchants, since the first two are so active and can provide enough benefits and hope, the wise choice is of course to reduce investment in the third place and instead pour resources into the first two.

Before 2021, Douyin and Kuaishou were the top two in the short video track, and Video Account was the third; but starting at the end of 2022 at the latest, Douyin and Video Account were the top two, and Kuaishou became the third. Whether in terms of the number of users, user time or content richness, Video Account has already secured the second place in the short video platform; the only thing it lacks is the level of commercialization. However, judging from the development speed of Video Account information flow advertising and comment area advertising, it should be a matter of time before it jumps to second place in this field. Now all the pressure has shifted to Kuaishou.

According to a friend of mine who is a bit extreme and never stops making shocking statements (also an e-commerce practitioner), "As long as the traffic of Video Account continues to grow, and the support for e-commerce content is strengthened in terms of rules, operations and infrastructure, then Kuaishou will be marginalized within 1-2 years." He further explained that because Video Account has most of the advantages of Kuaishou, and the creators' gameplay is somewhat similar to Kuaishou (although not exactly the same), as long as they can provide similar monetization capabilities as Kuaishou, a large number of creators will turn to Video Account without hesitation. As we all know, e-commerce sales are the most important monetization channel for Kuaishou creators. If Video Account does this well, then Kuaishou can be completely "replaced".

"Those who play in the public domain and aim for explosive growth will choose Douyin, those who play in the private domain and community operation will choose Video Account, and vertical creators will choose Xiaohongshu, Bilibili or other vertical platforms. In this picture, Kuaishou will become one of the 'other vertical platforms' and no longer the most mainstream video platform." This friend summed up his point of view.

Please note that the opinions I cited above are mainly other people's opinions, including the core opinion that "Kuaishou will be marginalized by WeChat Video Account", which are not my own. As for my own opinion? The experience of the past years and the experience of creating on the Video Account platform tell me that Kuaishou's ecological niche does have some overlap with Video Account, and it is indeed threatened by the latter. However, it is not possible to conclude that Kuaishou will definitely lose its competitiveness with the development of Video Account. We must clearly understand the following two points:

1. The WeChat team and even the entire Tencent (except for games) are not good at heavy operations, from traffic operations, event operations to customer service. Since its inception, the basic strategy of WeChat Video Account has been to solve problems from the product side and not invest too much effort in operations. Although Kuaishou's operational capabilities and budget are not as good as Douyin, they are still very powerful.
2. The WeChat team (not limited to video accounts) still has the attitude of taking one step at a time and controlling development towards e-commerce live streaming, which is based on both business philosophy and practical considerations. As early as 2022, when the WeChat Mini Store function was upgraded, a group of Taobao agents and live streaming anchors were eager to rush in; they were soon disappointed. There is no evidence to support that video accounts can become a mainstream live streaming e-commerce platform in the short term.

It can be seen that in the past year, the number of content and accounts that bring goods has increased in the video accounts; in the past six months, e-commerce live broadcasts have obviously replaced knowledge teaching live broadcasts and become the focus of live broadcast entrance traffic. However, this does not mean that the video account will go all-in on e-commerce; in fact, the video account will never and cannot go all-in on anything.

My friend’s point of view is actually: if Video Account is willing to develop e-commerce aggressively and in big strides, it can have the effect of cutting off the source of funds for Kuaishou, thereby “marginalizing” the latter, given that Video Account already has traffic advantages and has established a solid content ecosystem. But this will not happen; even if the WeChat team decides to do so, Tencent’s overall infrastructure, supply chain, and operational capabilities do not support this decision. Therefore, most of the anchors and MCNs who are good at Kuaishou e-commerce do not have a particularly strong motivation to migrate to Video Account in the short term; Video Account is just a sub-base for them (although a relatively important sub-base).

So, can the management of Kuaishou rest easy? Obviously not. In terms of traffic and operating mechanism, the similarities and even overlaps between Video Account and Kuaishou are real. Video Account is now the second in the short video industry, not Kuaishou. This change is also real. Just like a person is not seriously ill now, but there are obvious health risks in his living environment. If he continues to neglect to deal with it, he will really get seriously ill.

At this moment, we can be sure that the incident of "Kuaishou being marginalized by WeChat Video Account" has not yet happened, but it is by no means an unfounded worry. What countermeasures can Kuaishou take? This is beyond the scope of this article, and perhaps we can discuss it in the future.

Author: Pei Pei, leader of the Phantom Thieves

WeChat public account: Internet Phantom Thieves (ID: TMTphantom), Internet industry observer and researcher.