At the beginning of the new year of 2024, local life has taken the center stage in the latest page of China's Internet economy. Different from the previous business war narrative in which the group spent money lavishly on subsidy wars and the distribution outlets and service stations were criticized by opponents, the smoke of the latest round of local life wars has burned inside the castle. ByteDance was the first to take action. At the end of 2023, Pu Yanzi, the head of commercialization of Douyin Group, also served as the head of life service business. Then Meituan, the absolute big brother of local life, also changed its leader around the Spring Festival. Zhang Chuan, who had been in power for 6 years, unloaded the heavy responsibility, retained some businesses such as Dianping, SaaS and cycling power banks, and handed over most of the in-store and platform businesses to Wang Puchong. Alibaba, the other leader of local life, also announced that its prince Yu Yongfu stepped down and delegated power to the actual business leaders of maps and home delivery. The reasons for disclosing management changes vary, ranging from capital difficulties to managers' personal focus issues, but the fact that the top players in the market changed almost at the same time and on the same track can only prove one thing: almost all participants are dissatisfied with the current status of local life, but at the same time they all feel that this track is full of opportunities. In this article, we explore what problems have arisen in the current state of local life and what will be the core of the struggle in this field in the future. 1. New ProblemsFirst of all, we must make it clear that in terms of business segmentation, each company has a different segmentation caliber. For example, Alibaba's pan-local life covers maps, food delivery, new retail and other formats, while Meituan mainly focuses on in-store, food delivery and hotel travel. If we discuss all of them, different businesses have different entry points, such as home delivery to see fulfillment, store delivery to see write-offs, and so on. A single leaf can tell the coming of autumn. Today, we will use the in-store business with a relatively low threshold (no need to consider infrastructure barriers such as logistics and distribution) as an entry point to summarize the biggest new problem in local life in 2023: inaction on the supply side. It is mainly reflected in two aspects: 1. Weak supply of new storesOne of the core KPIs of the in-store business team is the number of contracts signed by supply-side merchants. During this round of epidemic cycle, platform companies have embarked on two waves of bonus periods: one is the substantial increase in the online rate of catering during the epidemic, and the other is the explosion of catering entrepreneurship in the early post-epidemic period last year . However, it is obvious that both have entered a rapid cooling period. The growth rate of the online ordering market has rapidly declined from 71.3% in 2014 to 19.8% at the beginning of last year. In the first quarter of this year, the number of newly registered catering companies in the four cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen decreased by 43.96% year-on-year, and the popularity has greatly decreased. Figure: Number of catering companies registered in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in a single quarter, source: Tianyancha, compiled by Jinduan More importantly, the elimination rate of the catering industry is increasing rapidly. According to the data of the "White Paper on China's Catering Brand Power 2023", the catering elimination rate (cancellation volume/registration volume) in the first eight months of 2023 reached 34.7%, far exceeding the same period of three years. On the one hand, the growth rate of new stores is declining, and on the other hand, the survival rate and the operating cycle are shortened. For the platform, the growth rate of B-end merchants' supply is gradually slowing down, and it can be predicted that the trend has just started, and there will be more obvious supply shortages in a certain medium and short period. 2. The low-price system is brokenAnother notable phenomenon is that the homogeneity of products among merchants on various platforms is becoming increasingly apparent. We selected the group purchase packages of restaurants in Beijing with the highest sales volume from Douyin and Meituan, and found that the difference in the average customer price of the mainstream group purchase packages between the two platforms does not exceed RMB 5 (the figure shows that some Douyin platforms offer discounts of RMB 6 or less for new customers), and the discounts for new customers and payment are basically the same. Figure: Package prices displayed on some platforms, source: Meituan APP, Douyin APP If we look at some brands that are not promoted by the platform, the price list of the packages available for the two platforms is very consistent. In other words, in the current market environment, there will no longer be a single catering company or brand that bets on a certain platform for common growth and is willing to pay a preferential cost far below the market price for the platform. It is more like a reed in the wind, a boat in the waves, and will go wherever there is short-term profit . In a horizontal comparison, there has also been a deep-rooted change in the brand restaurant's perception of group purchase prices. The current average price per customer in restaurants is tending to be consistent with the average price per person in group purchases. On the one hand, the increase in the number of group purchase diners may have lowered the average price per customer. On the other hand, it may also be that the prices of group purchase products launched by merchants have further increased . If we look at the current Meituan caliber, it is more inclined to the latter. We can see from the sales caliber that no matter how much the package is sold, the average customer price of group purchases and the average merchant per capita are not much different. In other words: merchants no longer believe that the so-called low price is the rationality of everything. Behind all low-price strategies, there must be people who bear the costs. For products with high concentration of production factors, consumers pay for the monopoly after the formation of monopoly. For products with low concentration of production factors, the merchants who withdraw halfway pay for the bill, and catering is the latter. For those in the catering industry, the low-price effect can only bring about limited customer flow and repeat purchases, and when brand merchants give up low-priced packages, they will suffer backlash, especially for non-chain local restaurants that rely on repeat purchases: old customers will assume that the restaurant has lowered its consumption quality and positioning just because it has launched low-priced packages, new customers are not effectively converted, and old customers cannot be retained, which is not worth the loss. To sum up, the most obvious feature of the local life track in 2023 is the inaction on the supply side. Whether in terms of absolute numbers or the degree of dispersion of the interests of merchants and platforms, irreversible changes have taken place. II. The Appearance of All BeingsLet’s first take a look at how the local business of the top players will perform in 2023:
Figure: Meituan and Alibaba local life financial report data, source: corporate financial report
From the revenue perspective, it confirms the logic that the local life track still has growth potential. The hotel and travel industry has recovered quickly after the epidemic and is also one of the sub-categories with the highest revenue contribution in the local life track. The growth rate of in-store business is faster than that of home delivery business. Let's take a look at the cost side. Where do people focus their resources (money)?
Let’s summarize the resource investment of the first three in a picture: Figure: Meituan, Alibaba, and ByteDance focus on local life resources, Source: Jinduan Research Institute Obviously, each company's strategy is to "strengthen its strengths and overcome its weaknesses", with Meituan improving its content and Alibaba and Bytedance amplifying its traffic. However, from the perspective of the core business, the leading players are actually targeting the invisible barrier of the local life track - the credit system . 3. Winning HandWhy is the credit system said to be the new arena for local life? First of all, the current situation is just as analyzed in the previous article. The increase in B-side supply is gradually slowing down, and the difference between competing products is also narrowing. Without increase, we have to emphasize repeat purchases. This is the essential difference between local life and cultural tourism. The former emphasizes long-term sustainability, while the latter emphasizes one-time consumption stimulation. Secondly, based on the classic consumer behavior model, the core logic of increasing repeat purchases lies in reducing the involvement of purchase decisions. As a business scenario with little brand differentiation, most decisions of in-store business rely on habitual purchases. Consumers often buy products that are familiar, trusted, or close to the regional location in this decision. Finally, relying on the characteristics of habitual purchases, for the platform, pre-purchase cognition and post-purchase evaluation are equally important. The core product functions need to follow two points:
Figure: Habitual purchasing feature link, source: Consumer Behavior Overall, it is necessary to build a complete credit system as a platform. From this point of view, it is easy to understand the actions of current market players. The quality of the local life credit system is currently Meituan> Douyin> Ali . Dianping's long-term credit accumulation and wide coverage are actually one of the core barriers of Meituan's local business. One of the reasons why the conversion rate of Douyin's local life window is not high is that it suffers from the lack of complete rating data and system. When you are planting a package in a short video, do you still need to open Dianping to check the rating . Douyin’s advantage lies in the credit advantage brought by local mid-level anchors. A large number of consumers are willing to choose products recommended by trusted anchors, and they essentially trust the anchors’ credit. This is why Douyin decided to develop the 3-5 tier markets and support a large number of mid-level and local anchors, because the credit of acquaintances in the sinking market is higher than the platform’s credit . However, it is obvious that both have entered a rapid cooling period. The growth rate of the online food ordering market has dropped from 71% in 2014 to 1.5% in 2017. Figure: Douyin local life content, influencer growth trend, source: Juliang Suansu City Research Institute But overall, Dianping's advantage is still significantly higher than the credit advantage of current content anchors, after all, it has a wide coverage and deep data accumulation. Meituan's content creation is not just to sell more banners, but also has such considerations. However, at present, the leader of acquaintance credit in the sinking market is neither Meituan nor Douyin, but Kuaishou. Therefore, if Douyin wants to rely on the sinking market to open up the local track, it needs to be wary of Kuaishou, a potential opponent . As for Ali Local Life, at present, AutoNavi's traffic value is far less than Douyin's content pool. Although its reputation has been improved, its current evaluation system is not as good as Dianping's, and there is still a long way to go. Therefore, what Meituan needs to do is how to magnify the advantages of Dianping and how to stimulate user motivation for positive reviews (negative reviews have much more motivation than positive reviews). This may be the strategic focus of the next stage after filling the gaps in content. For Douyin, how to connect the evaluation system and the expert system to achieve a local promotion conversion rate greater than that of the huge engine is the core point of the next step. And for Alibaba, perhaps what it should think about more is how to drive local life from the payment flow (life payment) instead of relying on Gaode. After all, the traffic value of tool-like products is relatively low. The smoke of war has risen in the new local life battlefield surrounding the credit system, but it is far from the time to judge success or failure. Let us wait and see. Author: Yaohua; Source public account: Jinduan (ID: 1092663) |
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