Has TikTok become the “public enemy of giants”?

This article starts with the three battles that Douyin launched at the beginning of the year, and objectively analyzes how much Douyin is sure to win and how confident it is to lose in the face of the Internet giants who are good at dividing and attacking. It is recommended for those who want to have a deep understanding of the future development of Douyin.

ByteDance is one of the most belligerent Internet companies, and TikTok, which is under its control, is becoming the "public enemy of giants."

In the first quarter of 2023, Douyin launched three low-key battles, further clarifying the years-long secret war between ByteDance and several Internet giants.

The first battle was to challenge Meituan. Ten years ago, Meituan started the food delivery war and eventually monopolized 70% of the market. Ten years later, Douyin disrupted the situation. On one hand, it formed an alliance with Ele.me. I do "in-store" and you do "home delivery". We jointly resist Meituan, which delivers both in-store and home. On the other hand, we extend to "group purchase and delivery", which is similar to the food delivery business. Some people in the local life industry said that the local food delivery war between Douyin and Meituan will inevitably escalate into a full-scale war in local life. Meituan has already faced the enemy head-on, formulated a prevention strategy internally, and joined forces with Kuaishou externally.

The second battle was to attack Alibaba and JD.com. Douyin "opened a supermarket" and imitated Tmall Supermarket and JD.com Supermarket. This was actually Douyin's penetration into shelf e-commerce after interest e-commerce reached its ceiling. JD.com and Alibaba chose to take the challenge on their main sites.

The third battle is to pursue Xiaohongshu. Douyin has replicated Xiaohongshu in its app, exploring the "Xiaohongshu-style grass planting". Xiaohongshu is also attacking the opponent's hinterland and betting on live e-commerce.

Like an octopus, Tik Tok has extended its tentacles into the territories of too many giants, and behind this is ByteDance’s valuation anxiety.

ByteDance, known as the "APP factory", is best at Douyin and TikTok. TikTok has over 1 billion daily active users worldwide, but its road to internationalization is full of obstacles. "Douyin has 700 million daily active users, and ByteDance is handing over the business that made the internet giants famous to Douyin to do it again, with the goal of quickly increasing its valuation," said an entertainment investor.

Douyin, which is rushing to monetize its traffic, has picked up the "follow-up strategy" again: first direct traffic to the giants, then "borrow a boat to go to sea", and when the time is right, cut external links, build a closed loop, and divide the market. From the past short videos, live e-commerce, group buying, to the current shopping malls, supermarkets, and takeout, it is the same. Entering 2023, when Douyin, which has challenged Baidu and Tencent, attacks local life, e-commerce, and communities, it is being listed as the number one enemy by more Internet giants.

Facing a group of experienced winners, how confident is Douyin in winning and how confident is it in losing? Facing the Internet giants who are good at dividing and conquering, how long can Douyin fight a war of attrition?

01Challenge Meituan: Takeaway penetration is low-key, local life is fierce

Open the Douyin APP, the first-level entrance "Same City" includes food, leisure and entertainment, beauty salons, hotels and homestays, surrounding tourism, etc., it is like a short video version of Meituan.

Among them, "food" is even more of a tough challenge to Meituan. Since last year, it has vigorously promoted local group purchases, and then entered the field of food delivery. The "Heart-beating Food Delivery" business that Douyin tested in July 2021 has long been aborted. Now it is fighting for food delivery again, with two modes: aggregation and direct operation. Douyin calls its direct food delivery business "group purchase and delivery", which was first launched in Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu. Users can place orders on the food delivery page. Changqing, a local life service provider, said that it was launched in early December last year, mainly delivered by cooperative service providers, such as Dada, SF Express, UU Running Errands, Flash Delivery, etc. Merchants can also deliver by themselves.

In other pilot cities, Douyin food delivery is an aggregation model, that is, users enter the "Ele.me Food Delivery" mini program to order food, and the merchants match it with Ele.me's delivery system. The aggregation model has been launched in many cities across the country since August last year, and the direct-operated model has been quietly promoted recently. Feng Xiao, a food delivery operator, said that although Douyin's direct-operated food delivery "opens" in cities slowly, it continues to provide traffic support to merchants outside the above three cities, with the aim of influencing the target merchants first, "planting grass" for users through information flow recommendations, and starting user habit cultivation.

Chang Qing revealed that after the team is established, the goal of Douyin Takeaway is to directly cover first-tier to third-tier cities, and low-tier cities will most likely be handed over to agents. To grab meat from Meituan, Douyin must compete in a different position. If you pursue speed, Douyin Takeaway may disappoint you. Douyin does not compete with Meituan in terms of efficiency, but in addition to immediate delivery, it has added a form of "pre-ordering", that is, you can make an appointment for the delivery time of the next day. This form was later cancelled; currently, "stock up first and then deliver" has been added, which is equivalent to buying a takeaway voucher, with optional time, and delivery within one hour at the fastest. A person in charge of a tea brand revealed that in order to increase orders, they will subsidize the cost of setting Douyin's discount lower, and the price to consumers will be 5-10 yuan lower than that of Meituan.

Feng Xiao added that Douyin plans to start with afternoon tea, cakes and desserts, because consumers are more tolerant of the delivery time of afternoon tea. Meituan Waimai mainly targets small and medium-sized businesses, while Douyin focuses on large, medium and Internet celebrity catering businesses , and has recently focused on developing Chinese restaurant chains.

By focusing on top merchants, Douyin, on the one hand, wants to increase the average order value and make up for the shortcoming of high delivery costs. Most of the products in "group purchase and delivery" are fixed packages ranging from 70 yuan to more than 100 yuan, "avoiding" the range of less than 50 yuan that Meituan Takeout mainly targets; on the other hand, "Douyin is targeting advertising fees, and top merchants have more sufficient budgets for brand promotion and customer acquisition," Song Rui, a catering group purchase service provider, told Kaiboli Finance.

In the rules set by Douyin, it is also difficult for small and medium-sized catering businesses to get a share of the pie. A service provider invested by Huang Bo, chairman of the Chengdu branch of Taobao Alliance, is doing Douyin takeaway live broadcasts. He revealed that the traffic algorithm is distributed based on geographic location. The more branches a merchant has, the smaller the loss of POI distribution (adding location information when publishing). If a merchant has only one store in an area, the traffic loss of POI distribution is extremely large. Assuming there are 100 stores, it can be distributed to 10km around the 100 stores, with a larger range and higher efficiency. Unlike the traffic business, which can see returns immediately, the takeaway business is a hard nut to crack. Feng Xiao concluded that Douyin's ground power is relatively weak, and there is no plan to do fulfillment and delivery for the time being. The efficiency and cost will not reach the level of Meituan in a short time.

"Group purchase and delivery", which has not yet been launched on a large scale, will not hinder the takeaway pattern for the time being. A report from Guosheng Securities estimates that Douyin's takeaway GTV (Gross Transaction Value) may reach 43.2 billion in 2025, which will have little impact on the track pattern. Meituan's takeaway business GTV is 700 billion in 2021.

Douyin is far from threatening Meituan’s commission income, “but it is affecting Meituan’s advertising revenue,” Feng Xiao mentioned. Douyin’s food delivery now earns advertising revenue , and catering merchants can deliver short videos and live broadcasts, as well as advertising. A catering key account manager (KA manager) told Kaiboli Finance that some of Meituan’s top merchants have transferred part of their advertising budgets to Douyin. Behind the food delivery war is the battle between Douyin and Meituan for local life. “Douyin’s entry into food delivery is half based on its previous smooth progress in the group buying market.”

Song Rui described. According to official disclosure by Douyin, Douyin's local life services will cover more than 370 cities and more than 1 million cooperative stores by the end of 2022. Song Rui said that catering businesses account for a large proportion, "the catering industry is generally difficult to develop under the epidemic, and Douyin's in-store catering has the strongest growth." Local life is Douyin's business focus in 2023.

Kaibo Finance learned that Douyin will expand its local life service team, and its 2023 goal is 200 billion yuan, with in-store and hotel and travel accounting for the majority. Chang Qing revealed that in addition to testing the waters for food delivery, Douyin plans to focus on operating hotels and tourism (scenic spots, tickets, botanical gardens and zoos, etc.), and has opened up multiple in-store comprehensive categories (including leisure and entertainment, medical care, maternal and child pets, parent-child and sports and fitness). The next battlefield between Douyin and Meituan may be hotel and travel.

02 Attacking Alibaba and JD.com: Building shelves to ease the pressure on hobby e-commerce

In 2023, before the food delivery war, Douyin first provoked the supermarket war, but it did not receive as much attention as food delivery. However, Alibaba and JD.com, whose jobs are being targeted, have already taken action secretly. In January this year, Douyin officially launched its supermarket business nationwide. The entrance is in the Douyin Mall, that is, the "Shopping" page on the Douyin homepage. Douyin's "shopping" is mainly about shopping. Click to enter and you will see an interface similar to Taobao and Pinduoduo. The services provided by Douyin Supermarket are no different from the supermarket business of JD.com and Alibaba.

Douyin Mall (left) and Douyin Supermarket (right) interface

The product interface of Douyin Supermarket is highly similar to that of Tmall Supermarket, and the free shipping price is also the same as Tmall Supermarket’s 88 yuan. JD.com focuses on “quality products” and “worry-free after-sales service”, while Douyin focuses on “selected products” and “worry-free after-sales service”, which is similar to the self-operated concept of JD.com Supermarket.

At present, Douyin Supermarket mainly attracts new customers by subsidizing personal care products and snacks, issuing coupons, and offering “free shipping for new customers”. The only chance for Douyin to enter the supermarket market is to engage in price wars.

Zhuang Shuai, an expert in the retail e-commerce industry, said that supermarket users are price-sensitive, so subsidies are effective, but long-term subsidies may require continuous feedback from advertising and e-commerce businesses. Another difficulty for online supermarkets is that "the platform model is difficult to implement, and currently only the self-operated model has a successful precedent." Zhuang Shuai said that the self-operated model will pose a huge challenge to Douyin's existing organizational structure, such as the procurement and sales team.

"Jingdong Supermarket and Alibaba's Tmall Supermarket are the first and second in the field. Since last year, Douyin has focused on poaching some procurement, supply chain and other related persons from these two companies." A headhunter told Kaibo Finance. Gao Xu, the person in charge of a supermarket channel, has been paying close attention to the development of Douyin's supermarket business. He mentioned that in June last year, Douyin trial-operated "Douyin home delivery" in some cities, launched the hourly delivery service in July, and recruited investors in August. In January this year, it took advantage of the peak consumption season of the Spring Festival to launch it in a low-key manner.

According to Gao Xu's observation, logistics and product categories are the current shortcomings of Douyin Supermarket. In the distribution link, Douyin Supermarket, like takeout, is "controlled by others." JD Supermarket has JD Logistics, Tmall Supermarket has Daniao Logistics, and Douyin Supermarket still cooperates with third-party service providers, such as SF Express, Dada, and ZTO Express.

After placing orders and experiencing many practitioners who follow Douyin Supermarket, they found that Douyin Supermarket's delivery is very uncertain, and the delivery time displayed in different regions is different. According to Gao Xu, because Douyin Supermarket mainly ships from the warehouse in Dongguan, Guangdong, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, which are closer to the warehouse, can arrive the next day, not significantly behind JD Supermarket and Tmall Supermarket; areas outside Guangdong Province, such as Shanghai and Beijing, can only be "delivered the next day", and the arrival time varies from 2 to 4 days. In terms of categories, Douyin Supermarket shows that it covers nine categories, "but the overall richness is not enough, mainly standardized fast-moving consumer goods, and there is no fresh category," said Gao Xu.

An e-commerce manager of a leading FMCG brand said that there are many big brands in FMCG, such as Procter & Gamble, Unilever and their many sub-brands. These brands have strong voice and generally enter multiple supermarket channels, but most of them hope to gain incremental users through Douyin, and will not operate it as a main channel. The main categories of online supermarkets are rice, noodles, FMCG and fresh food. Gao Xu said that it is only a matter of time before Douyin Supermarket sells fresh food.

According to Zhou Lingfeng, an operator close to Douyin Mall, Douyin Supermarket will focus on fresh food this year and has set a sales target of tens of billions. However, like the supply chain and logistics system, it is difficult to make a big breakthrough in a short period of time. Therefore, at this stage, Douyin Supermarket is like Douyin Takeaway, which is concerned with appearance but not substance. Gao Xu told Kaibo Finance that offline fulfillment capabilities and supply chain capabilities are the highest moats of JD Supermarket and Tmall Supermarket. If Douyin Supermarket does not have a big price advantage, it will be difficult to change users' consumption habits and cut into the cake of the stock market.

Douyin will step up its efforts to build a mall this year. "Opening a supermarket" is actually an attack on the shelf e-commerce territory of Alibaba and JD.com. In the past, Douyin focused on the mindset of hobby e-commerce and lazy e-commerce. You don't need to search, and personalized algorithms will recommend products to you. But when Douyin's trillion-scale live e-commerce hits the ceiling, it is only a matter of time before it penetrates into shelf e-commerce with a higher repurchase rate and improves e-commerce monetization.

From the perspective of Douyin, if more traffic continues to be directed to transactions, excessive commercialization will inevitably affect content positioning and user experience, so it is necessary to open a "shopping" entrance, that is, a relatively independent shelf e-commerce, to alleviate the pressure of monetization on the recommendation page. From the perspective of brands, the high return rate of interest e-commerce has brought great supply chain risks, and a relatively stable "shelf" is needed.

Douyin also needs to occupy the market of bigger and better brands. "Currently, Douyin's brand pool is mainly small and medium-sized, because most of the brands that really make money and explode quickly are small and medium-sized brands." Huang Bo said, while big brands generally define interest e-commerce as mainly product promotion and user acquisition, and rely more on shelf e-commerce to sell goods .

From lazy e-commerce based on interest recommendations to shelf e-commerce based on active search, user mentality cannot be changed overnight. Zhuang Shuai said that there are two ways to accelerate the formation: participating in big promotions and increasing high-frequency consumption categories. "Opening a supermarket" belongs to the latter.

"Douyin's key industries for shelf placement in 2023 are high-frequency and high-repurchase food and personal care products," Zhou Lingfeng told Kaibo Finance. Kaibo Finance learned that the e-commerce team has the largest number of people in Douyin. In 2023, Douyin's overall e-commerce GMV target is no less than 2 trillion, of which the "pan-mall" target accounts for about 30%.

According to the information, Douyin e-commerce achieved a GMV of 1.41 trillion in 2022, a year-on-year increase of 76%. "If the user mentality is cultivated, there is a plan to develop a separate APP for Douyin Mall," said Zhou Lingfeng.

03 Chasing Xiaohongshu: The battle for content and talent

While Douyin is accelerating traffic monetization in the two tracks of local life and e-commerce, it is also trying to compete with Xiaohongshu for users. When you open the Douyin app, there is an "explore" entrance in the navigation bar of the homepage, with two columns interacting and the interface functions are similar to Xiaohongshu. After browsing, Kaibo Finance found that this section is mostly pictures, texts, and photo albums, with occasional videos, and the content is mainly about dressing, beauty, food, and travel.

Douyin’s exploration interface In the past two years, Douyin’s DAU (daily active users) growth rate has continued to slow down. “ Douyin’s strategy is no longer to develop new users, but to dig users from competitors’ platforms through operational means ,” Wang Li, a content operator, told Kaibo Finance. Xiaohongshu is a key benchmarking platform.

Xu Wen, a product manager close to TikTok, revealed that ByteDance has successively established special projects for Xiaohongshu and pictures and texts. The strategies have changed during this period, but the purpose is to emulate Xiaohongshu's grass-planting model, seize Xiaohongshu's core user group , and ultimately serve commercialization .

The Xiaohongshu project has been in operation for more than two years, focusing on the user group that overlaps the two products, namely young women in first- and second-tier cities who fit the Xiaohongshu user profile, grabbing the retention and e-commerce conversion of these users, and introducing creators covering this group. "This group is sensitive to e-commerce and has become or has the potential to become the main consumer, and is a high-net-worth user that Douyin focuses on developing," said Wang Li.

After studying the growth methods of Xiaohongshu, Douyin focused on note planting and picture and text promotion, but the conversion rate was relatively low. The "planting" channel was removed from the shelves at the beginning of last year, and the "exploration" section was launched. Douyin's picture and text project also encountered difficulties. Xu Wen introduced that this project initially targeted the user group that consumed picture and text content on Xiaohongshu, Weibo and even WeChat public accounts . Douyin hopes to establish a picture and text mindset based on the original video mindset to achieve user growth and retention, which is also for commercialization.

"Young users in first-tier to third-tier cities are more inclined to read graphic content during the day, including white-collar workers taking public transportation and college students playing with their phones in class." Xu Wen gave an example. According to her, the hesitation of the graphic project lies in the fact that Douyin started with BGM, and there is music in the graphic content, while the group that Douyin wants to convert the most is more accustomed to reading quiet graphic content; and there is also the worry that there is a possibility of "fighting" with the "old product" Toutiao in the future.

In general, the two projects encountered common problems. Wang Li said that it is difficult to establish Douyin's image and text mindset in a short period of time, and the effects of using images and text to convert users and increase GMV are not ideal . "Users educated by Xiaohongshu have basically become Xiaohongshu users. The supply of image and text content on the Douyin site is small in quantity and low in quality. After introducing Xiaohongshu creators and guiding KOLs on the site to create image and text content, there has been limited improvement, but the overall communication effect is poor." The change occurred in the second quarter of last year. It was not until Douyin saw the commercial space for vertical image and text content and on-site conversion that it continued to promote the two projects.

Xu Wen said that the biggest progress is that Douyin put pictures and pictures in the top-level entrance "Explore" section. The support plan for the special picture and text project was launched, mainly promoting vertical pictures and texts such as travel, store exploration and food, serving the commercialization of local life, and can be linked to the small yellow car and accept advertisements. The special project of Xiaohongshu has also been adjusted to serve the commercialization of e-commerce, hoping to directly convert the beauty, clothing and other categories that are weaker than Xiaohongshu into e-commerce GMV on the site.

Xu Wen revealed that Douyin has placed at least 20% of its e-commerce growth KPI on pictures and texts this year. The Xiaohongshu special project has reached its third phase and has been developed into a long-term project. "Douyin is expected to continue to poach Xiaohongshu's top and mid-level bloggers, learn from Xiaohongshu's content seeding model, and convert it into e-commerce GMV and merchant advertising ." Wang Li said.

04 Douyin "borrows a boat to go to sea", and the giants attack separately

Douyin has expanded the battle from local life and e-commerce to the community. This is a "follow-up strategy" that it has to make due to its anxiety about all-round growth in traffic, users, and commercialization.

This move once enabled Douyin to gain 700 million daily active users and a live streaming e-commerce scale of over 1 trillion yuan. Douyin was born nearly five years later than Kuaishou, and later, through three battles in the scale of the main APP, the battle of live streaming business, and the battle of overseas, it gradually widened the gap with Kuaishou in terms of daily and monthly active users.

When Douyin entered the live e-commerce market in the first half of 2020, Taobao Live had already been quietly operating for more than three years. But who would have thought that Douyin, which was still "directing traffic" to e-commerce giants at the time, would later grow into the fourth e-commerce pole after Alibaba, JD.com, and Pinduoduo. Since then, Douyin has become the public enemy of e-commerce giants, and it has also figured out a set of " follow-up strategies " to fight against the giants.

An industry insider who has been paying close attention to Douyin summarized the strategy into three steps:

In the early days, he was a "water seller ", directing traffic to the giants' business while monitoring the data within the site.

The second step is to " borrow a boat to go to sea ". When the embryonic form of the content and merchant ecosystem is established and more data is obtained, start to move forward in small steps.

The third step is to wait until the time is right, cut off external links, concentrate firepower on building a closed loop within the site , and divide up the market share of the giants.

External links refer to users clicking on links to jump to third-party e-commerce platforms for transactions. GMV is counted in third-party e-commerce platforms. Douyin does not provide transaction guarantees, fulfillment services, or charge commissions. Before entering the live e-commerce market, Douyin "directed" traffic to e-commerce giants such as Taobao and JD.com for two years. After nearly half a year of entry and the initial formation of the ecosystem, Douyin cut off the external links to e-commerce giants.

When it set its sights on the local home delivery business in 2022, Douyin did not want to be just a traffic seller, and began negotiations with Meituan and Ele.me. Feng Xiao revealed that Douyin had discussed with Meituan and Ele.me about entering the mini program, hoping to provide traffic to the other party in this way, but Meituan insisted on putting group purchase coupons, takeaway coupons, etc. in Douyin, and directly obtaining traffic from Douyin in the form of external links. In the end, Ele.me accepted Douyin's plan and the two sides cooperated.

" Ele.me will not completely stand on the Douyin camp . It 'contributes' merchants to Douyin and can also see Douyin's data. The two sides are now observing and cooperating with each other." Feng Xiao told Kaibo Finance. In 2023, Douyin has extended its tentacles to the territories of too many giants.

At the ByteDance 11th Anniversary Online Live Broadcast on March 16, Douyin Group CEO Zhang Nan said that last year and this year, Douyin has focused on three aspects: content, social networking, and services. "From group buying, shopping malls, supermarkets, takeaways, etc., it can be understood that Douyin has been enriching the categories of goods sold on the platform," Zhuang Shuai said.

Danger was brewing at the same time. The impact of the epidemic was being repaired, the domestic consumer market was gradually recovering, and the giants of all sizes whose territory had been invaded began to face the enemy head-on. Meituan launched a joint counterattack both internally and externally.

Internally, while looking for incremental battlefields for instant retail, Meituan’s main website has given more traffic to video content and added a new food delivery live broadcast channel. Feng Xiao revealed that Meituan has been focusing on monitoring Douyin’s food delivery orders and giving some merchants better advertising positions and certain advertising subsidies.

Externally, the "Meituan-Kuai" alliance has deepened. Previously, the Kuaishou APP launched the Meituan mini program, and many merchants have joined.

Next, " Meituan will try influencers to promote products and conduct marketing activities on Kuaishou ," Song Rui revealed. Kuaishou is also building a local life team to increase the corresponding traffic entrance. Alibaba and JD.com, two giants of shelf e-commerce, chose to face the enemy head-on on the main site, and price became the focus of competition. JD.com launched a high-profile subsidy of 10 billion yuan. "The subsidy ranges from a few yuan to thousands of yuan, basically covering all categories of JD.com, including supermarket fresh food," said Zhou Lingfeng.

According to LatePost, Alibaba has recently determined Taobao's five major strategies for this year, namely live broadcast, private domain, content, local retail and price power. Price power means that the price performance ratio will be implemented throughout the platform; live broadcast, private domain and content are important means to strengthen user stickiness and duration. Douyin "copied" Xiaohongshu in the APP, and Xiaohongshu also took action and began to increase the stakes in the e-commerce live broadcast war that has never been won.

First, Xiaohongshu APP was revised in early March. "The three channels of recommendation, shopping, and live broadcast in the 'Discover' page are fixed in the top three by default. Users can adjust other channels after pulling down the discovery page," explained a community product manager. This means that Xiaohongshu is going to end the dispute between commercialization and community. The live broadcast business officially launched in 2020 has finally made substantial progress, breaking away from the bloggers' private domain traffic and being directly pushed by the platform.

The default entry to the shopping and live streaming channels on the "Discover" page of Xiaohongshu was followed by news that Xiaohongshu was adjusting its organizational structure. According to a report by LatePost, Xiaohongshu has upgraded its live streaming business to an independent department to unify the management of live streaming content and live streaming e-commerce.

In 2023, Douyin will focus on expanding its footprint in e-commerce and local life, rushing to monetize traffic, and it is almost inevitable that it will clash with more giants. Combining the statements of two people close to ByteDance and Douyin's commercialization: In terms of advertising, ByteDance's advertising consumption target is 300 billion yuan, mainly from e-commerce, local life, and special industries such as tourism affected by the epidemic; Douyin's advertising consumption is also mainly e-commerce and local life services.

An operation manager close to Douyin said that Douyin has put pressure on Tencent, which is focusing on video accounts and e-commerce closed loops, as well as OTA platforms such as Ctrip. Douyin's biggest asset in challenging the giants is that it has reversed the situation in short videos and live e-commerce. These two victories are inseparable from the Internet environment at that time: the traffic dividend of mobile Internet around 2016, the further technological breakthroughs of live e-commerce, and the rise of e-commerce live streaming against the trend under the epidemic in 2020.

Today, if Douyin wants to truly surpass a giant and change the landscape of a market, " it needs to wait for the emergence of the next round of new opportunities, or business model innovation brought about by technological breakthroughs, " said Zhuang Shuai.

At the request of the interviewees, Chang Qing, Feng Xiao, Song Rui, Gao Xu, Zhou Lingfeng, Xu Wen and Wang Li are pseudonyms in this article.

Source: WeChat public account "Kaiboluo Finance (ID: kaiboluocaijing)"